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[T]he moral tragedy of human life comes almost
wholly from the fact that the link is ruptured
which normally should hold between vision of the
truth and action, and that this pungent sense of
effective reality will not attach to certain ideas.
The Principles of Psychology vol. II, 547
1 In what follows I shall investigate how the notions of truth and invention inform our
moral life. In particular, I will show how this idea has been explored by William James in
his seminal essay The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life (MPML), by far his most clear-cut
piece  of  moral  philosophy.  I  will  claim  that  the  dialectics  of  the  essay  cannot  be
apprehended  independently  from  the  understanding  of  the  moral  psychology  and
epistemology James  elaborates  in  his  writings  on pragmatism and the  philosophy of
mind. In fact, once framed in the relevant perspective, the essay conveys a very different
and more radical position that the one usually acknowledged. In MPML James engages in
an inquiry into the nature of moral thought and its ability to meet the difficulties of the
moral life it should address. The essay criticizes a certain image of moral reflection by
questioning its underlying assumptions about the nature of mindedness and the place of
truth in the moral life. I shall thus articulate the discussion of James’ essay along two
directions,  one methodological  and one substantive.  They are,  respectively,  the anti-
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foundational and anti-theoretical character of moral reflection, and the rethinking of the
relationship we have with our interiority that is relevant for ethics as informed by the
notion of truth.
⁂
2 MPML is at the same time the most quoted and yet the most misunderstood of James’
papers – a record it shares with The Will to Believe. My critical target is a received view of
James’ moral philosophy as a piece of utilitarian moral theory. Such a reading is the result
of  a  superficial  analysis  of  the  rhetoric  of  the  essay,  together  with  a  reductive  and
unimaginative understanding of James’ theory of truth underlying it. It is my ambition to
show that, once viewed in the proper light, the dialectic of the essay will reveal its real
stakes: namely, an exercise of conceptual criticism of the very image of moral reflection
aimed at showing the dangerousness of conceiving ethics ‘in the old-fashioned absolute
sense,’ that is as ‘dogmatically made up in advance’ in splendid isolation from the human
beings inhabiting it.  James is  neither interested in advancing any theory of  morality
whatsoever, nor in individuating the principles of human nature on which such an ethics
should be erected. His interest is rather that of showing the shape moral reflection should
take to meet the difficulties of the moral life it should address instead of castling itself
behind a moral theory or some metaphysical picture of human beings. Moral reflection,
according  to  James,  should  have  an  exhortative  character,  its  point  being  that  of
gesturing toward the varieties of ways in which we can be – or fail to be – touched by
situations that prompt our sensibility and understanding to respond ethically. In MPML
James explores the various aspects of our moral life, and shows how a deceptive picture of
moral psychology and epistemology hinders us from resolving some of its difficulties.
Consequently, if moral reflection aspires to have a genuine grasp of the moral life, it
should rethink its very credentials and investigate in the first instance what relationship
it should entertain with the varieties of moral experiences articulating our moral life.
3 Placing  James’  considerations  in  the  wider  context  of  his  conception  of  truth  and
mindedness will allow us to see the richness of this text as well as to appreciate its anti-
foundational inspirations.  I  will  be very selective in my use of James,  although these
themes  pervade  his  whole  philosophy  and  find  their  most  distinctive  voice  in  his
masterpiece  The  Principle  of  Psychology,  which  will  linger  in  the  background  of  my
investigations. In his writings on pragmatism and the mind James struggles to articulate
his insights about the interconnectedness of a refutation of a theoretical – as opposed to a
practical – understanding of our mental lives with a refutation of a picture of truth as
copying and representation.  These two insights  are  pivotal  for  the understanding of
James’ moral philosophy as a whole, and the essay under examination in particular, since
in it James complains about the narrow understanding of moral reflection as driven by a
distorted intellectualistic characterization of our mindedness and worldliness. My claim
will be that, if we frame MPML in this broader context, a much richer image of moral
thought – one very instructive for the contemporary debate – will emerge.
⁂
4 James  wrote  MPML in  1891  as  an  address  to  the  Yale  Philosophical  Club.  Given the
academic setting of the lecture, James’ interest was that of showing the limits and point
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of a philosophical account of morality. The aim of the lecture-essay is not in fact the
advancement of any moral theory, but the investigation into its very possibility. This
point  has  been surprisingly overlooked in the critical  literature on James.  A notable
exception is the book by Sergio Franzese on James’ moral philosophy, in which the author
advances a reading of MPML on these lines, that is, as a critical inquiry into the very
nature  and  feasibility  of  moral  reflection.  Franzese  traces  back  the  deceiving
interpretation of the essay to the popular account that Ralph Barton Perry gave of James’
moral philosophy in his monumental The Thought and Character of William James, in which
James’ protégée, by failing to appreciate the leitmotiv of the essay, advanced a very biased
reading of his mentor’s moral thought. Franzese argues that a more attentive inquiry will
reveal how
[t]he essay of 1891 does not work as an outline of a moral theory because it was
certainly not intended to be one.  On the contrary,  it  was intended to show the
futility of that traditional philosophical task, which is perhaps why philosophers
have intended not to read it too closely […] [t]he ‘The Moral Philosopher and the
Moral Life’ is a critical analysis of the validity of any moral theory, in the terms of
its relation to the moral philosopher, rather than presenting another specific moral
theory.1
5 According to Franzese, MPML has been variously read as a moral system advancing a
theory of goods and values, whereas James was interested in showing the futility of such
an approach to moral reflection and its prescriptive pretensions. Franzese proceeds in
tracing the roots of James’ innovative inquiry in the Wundtian school of psychology and
its bearings for the debate about the axiological crisis that characterized the end of XIX
century  and  invested  the  discourse  about  the  statute  of  philosophical  accounts  of
morality. Alternatively, here I want to explore at some depth the philosophical motives
internal to James’ thought that prompted such a characterization. Once freed from these
misplaced attributions and returned to its proper fieldwork, an opposite picture of moral
reflection will be revealed through the lines of the essay. I shall claim that the reading of
James’ moral thought as a defense of utilitarianism commits a categorical mistake, since
not only is James very critical of utilitarianism2 – as regards both its underlying moral
psychology  (an  untenable  atomistic  picture  of  experiencing  and  a  related  narrow
conception of consequence), and its teleological aspirations (the sublimation of utility or
pleasure  as  the  only  criteria  of  goodness)  –,  but  he  is  also  skeptical  about  the  very
possibility  of  moral  theory,  be  it  utilitarian  or  not.  In  MPML James  is  interested  in
showing if, how, and to what extent our moral life can be pictured and understood by
means of moral reflection. For this reason MPML represents a key text for the assessment
of James’ whole moral philosophy: in it we can find the instructions that will tell us how
to read the ethical investigations pervading James’ writings. A misreading of MPML will
thus convey a paltry understanding of the whole of James’s moral philosophy. A good
understanding of James’ moral philosophy will thus require the proper understanding of
the place of MPML in respect to the widespread moral instructions.
6 James  articulates  in  his  other  writings.  However,  it  is  not  easy  to  characterize  the
connection between James’ methodological considerations on the nature of morality as
presented in MPML and the moral ideas as they are explored in his other works. As the
vast majority of commentators have suggested, the character of James’ investigation was
deeply ethical, so that most of his discussions about the mind, the world and the varieties
of  encounters  between the  two  were  driven  by  ethical  concerns.  Even  metaphysical
discussions were for James au fond urged by moral constraints and permeated by moral
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interests. His assertion that the very question between monism and pluralism cannot be
settled independently from considerations about the importance of the two options for
one’s moral life is well known. It is thus difficult to tell the difference between MPML,
widely acknowledged as either his only or his clearest work in moral philosophy, and the
widespread references to morality pervading his other writings.3
7 A fistful  of  authors4 have  strived  for  the  understanding  of  this  connection,  but  the
majority of the interpretations failed to appreciate the point due to their misreading of
the tone and the aims of the essay altogether, since even if they rightly acknowledge the
importance of the essay for the understanding of James’ moral philosophy, still they stuck
with a reading of it as a defense of a peculiar moral theory. Since I am impatient to
present my own reading, in the next section I will briefly sketch the essential structure of
the two main families of readings so as to place my own understanding of James’ moral
philosophy in context.
⁂
8 As I have been arguing, a good reading of MPML represents the necessary conditions to
grasp James’ conception of ethics, and either this essay has not been recognized as special
at all, or its distinctiveness has been misplaced. Ralph Burton Perry’s account falls into
the  first  case.  Perry,  in  his  monumental  work  on  James,  does  not  appreciate  the
peculiarity  of  the  essay  and  melts  James’  writings  together,  losing  in  this  way  the
asymmetry holding between MPML and his other writings containing his moral ideas. In
chapters LXV and LXVI of the book he insists on the moralistic and militant character of
James’  moral  reflection.  Perry seems to acknowledge the distinctiveness of  MPML by
saying that the essay is James’ only published discussion of theoretical ethics. He claims
that in it James addressed the question, raised a couple of years before in his essay titled
The  Sentiment  of  Rationality,  ‘What  does  the  moral  enthusiasm care  for  philosophical
ethics?’  This  question,  raised  in  a  paper  in  which  James  –  among  other  things  –
investigates the peculiar frame of mind that prompts us to crave for rationality in our
philosophical  investigations,  seems  to  fit  suitably  the  purposes  of  MPML.  In  fact,  it
conveys the sense of the problematization James addresses in his characterization of the
relationship between one’s own moral ideas – or ‘enthusiasm’ – and a reflective – or
‘philosophical’ – ethics. However, although very encouraging, Perry’s account wastes its
promises by reducing the reflective discourse about morality to the discussion of the
character of individual interests and demands and their relation with the social life in
which  their  bearers  partake.  Moreover,  Perry  presents  this  discourse,  which  he
characterizes as the center of vision of James’ conception of ethics, as a fallout of his
personal biography. He writes
[t]here is an undeniable moral accent in the life as well as in the thought of William
James. In view of the fact that he subordinated thought to action, and therefore in
principle accepted the Kantian doctrine of the “primacy of practical reason,” it is
surprisingly  that  he  wrote  so  little  on  moral  philosophy.  But  this  comparative
inattention to the traditional  problems and theories  of  ethics  was offset  by the
strength of his moral convictions. His total expression was infused with moral zeal
– his personal code was rigorous and unmistakable.5
9 The quotation is very perspicacious. Instead of exposing the arguments given in MPML
Perry engages in a very captivating survey of James’ moral ideas, as they are discussed by
James in his other writings. Even if the texts and ideas he presents are of the utmost
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importance and are deeply pertinent  for  the understanding of  the themes tacked in
MPML, Perry makes two related mistakes at once: he conflates the reflective with the
purely descriptive,  and characterizes both as the outcome of James’  eclectic personae.
Even if the effort to show the deep entanglement of biography and philosophy in James is
nothing but praise-worthy, since it is an aspect of his thought that should be remarked
with great emphasis, Perry’s account went so far as to reduce James’ philosophy to his
biography, losing in this way the most interesting reflective dimension of his discourse.6
It is my claim that if we take James’ philosophical insights in their own terms, and try to
understand them as the result of reflective investigations, the very connection with the
experiences from which such investigations at the same time spring and get transformed
will be illuminated. These two aspects – namely, biography and philosophy – must be kept
in contrastive tension, since the subordination of one to the other will bring us either to
an aprioristic  conception of  philosophy or  to  the  very  opposite  annihilation of  it,  a
flattening of one on the other will obscure the nature of their connection. In the case we
are examining, that is James’ moral philosophy, this tension is built into the very dialectic
of  MPML.  In the essay James pictures the relationship between moral  reflection and
moral life neither as one of derivation nor of reduction, but rather of mutual definition.
Moral reflection emerges from our internal understanding of the practical contingencies
of our moral life, but cannot be reduced to them. Moral reflection makes sense on the
background  of  some  shared  practices  and  ideas,  and  the  rationality  it  expresses  is
internal to such practices and ideas. At the same time, by means of moral reflection we
investigate the very conceivability of a certain moral idea or experience, so that its role is
not merely descriptive. I will go back to this characterization in the next section. Let me
now move to the other family of readings, namely the ones which misplace the distinctive
voice of MPML.
10 Richard Gale’s book The Divided Self  of  William James,  whose interpretation of James is
remarkable  in  several  ways,  represents  a  good example  of  a  reading mindful  of  the
distinctive  place  of  MPML  in  James’  moral  philosophy,  but  inattentive  to  its  anti-
theoretical inspiration. Gale tackles the question directly, arguing for a radical distance
between James’ ethical theory and his normative moral ideas. Let me quote the passage in
its entirety, since it is very rich and eloquent. He writes
[J]ames’ only published effort to develop an ethical theory is his 1891 essay on “The
Moral  Philosopher  and the  Moral  Life”  […]  [T]hat  James  never  felt  the  need to
publish anything further on ethical theory,  either before or after 1891,  is  strong
evidence that he accepted its position throughout, especially as there is nothing in
his  unpublished  writings  indicating  any  doubts  or  reservations,  only  further
corroborations of the 1891 essay. The word theory is italicized so as to emphasize
the contrast  with the moralizing espousal  of  normative propositions,  something
that James did in profusion throughout his career. John Dewey failed to make this
distinction  when  he  said  that  ‘William  James  did  not  need  to  write  a  separate
treatise on ethics, because in its larger sense he was everywhere and always the
moralist.’  It  will  be  seen  that  some  of  his  moralizing  had  a  distinctively
deontological tone that clashed with his maximizing ethical theory.7
11 Such a reading, although having the merit of pointing to the special character of MPML,
portrays MPML as advancing a utilitarian moral theory that would be at odds with the
deontological principles suffusing his other moral writings. I contend that Gale’s reading
of  James’  moral  philosophy  as  driven  by  an  alleged  clash  between  normative
deontological propositions with maximizing ethical principles is the fallout of his reading
of the underlying conception of truth and its bearings for ethics. The difference in our
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respective reading amounts thus to a difference in our different reading of his conception
of truth. While Gale reads James as equating truth with usefulness, pushing him toward
an utilitarian teleology whose chief principle says “we are always morally obliged to act
in a  manner that  maximises  desire-satisfaction over desire-dissatisfaction among the
actions available to us,”8 I read James as portraying truth as a peculiar state of mind – an
inventive one – whose grounding lies in the relationship of interest our mind establishes
with the world. ‘Interest’ is for James a technical term, and unlike usefulness it has a
normative grounding in how things are in the world, and not only in how we would like
them to be. Its direction of fit is from the world to the mind, and yet the world that is
relevant for ethics is one of our ordinary practices and shared values. Truth consists in
what is interesting to notice, what is worth (and not merely useful) having and requires
an active endorsement on the part of the subject, who must pay attention to its moral
experiencing as it is embedded in his ordinary practices of truth- and value-giving. Being
grounded  in  this  conception  of  truth,  ethical  values  do  not  need  any  teleological
justification, and James’ discussion in MPML of the nature of values is not intended as a
foundation  but  rather  an  elucidation  of  their  place  in  our  practices.  This  aspect  is
connected with the refutation of Gale’s reading of MPML as James’ moral system: if read
as  a  moral  theory,  MPML would appear  rather  incoherent  since  in  it  James  holds  a
number of statements that at first blush seem incompatible. Gale would thus be right in
claiming that James’ self was (morally) divided between a promethean pragmatist holding
a  maximizing  principle  of  optimization  of  goods  and  an  anti-promethean  mystic
struggling to make religious and spirituals ideals respectable again in a disenchanted
world. However, the alleged moral aporias contained in MPML can be met by refusing to
read  James’  claims  at  face  value,  and  investigating  the  rhetoric  in  which  they  are
articulated.  From  such  a  reading  it  will  emerge  that  James’  interest  is  not  that  of
grounding values anywhere,  but rather that  of  portraying how our understanding of
them is vitiated by misconceptions about our mindedness and its bearings for our moral
life. Through such an investigation, we could also re-interpret Gale’s claim that in other
writings  James  employs  deontological  principles  that  are  not  explicitly  discussed  in
MPML, since it will emerge in which sense James’ moral instructions in the essay are
directed precisely against the attempts to moralize morality and reduce moral reflection
to the defense of a narrow and well-characterized picture of what counts as a moral
experience.
⁂
12 I will argue, contra Perry, that it is not true that James was uninterested in the traditional
problems  and  theories  of  ethics,  since  his  interest  was  precisely  a  critique  of  their
understanding.  His  goal  was  that  of  showing  the  shortcomings  and  difficulties  of
characterizing the aim of  moral  reflection as  the achievement of  a  normative moral
system. However, this critique makes space for another conception of moral reflection
sketched  in  MPML,  one  that  has  a  distinctive  reflective  status  that  must  not  to  be
conflated with the moral ideas pervading his other works, even if it entertains a close
relationship with them. Instead, contra Gale, I will argue that in MPML James canvasses a
precise  picture  of  the  entanglement  between moral  reflection and moral  life  that  is
neither one of mutual incompatibility nor one of reduction – one that does not lead to
any utilitarian moral theory. In order to understand the nature of such an entanglement
we must decrypt James’ assertion that the aim of moral reflection is the clarification, and
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not the foundation, of our moral life. As James argues, an ethics must be hortatory rather
than prescriptive:  it  must convey the unsatisfactoriness or the adequacy of  a certain
moral idea or conduct, and the means by which it should do that is not by pointing to
some alleged principle they violate or honor, but rather by describing the assumptions on
which their endorsement rests and inviting us to challenge its validity. Moral reflection
should thus be descriptive rather than prescriptive, and it should be articulated along the
experiences and experimentations human beings endorse in their  ordinary practices.
This does not mean however that moral reflection consists in a descriptions devoid of any
normative element; in fact the dichotomy between the merely descriptive and normative,
as well as that between facts and values, is refuted by James as a residuum of a Cartesian
framework, inherited and developed in opposite directions but with same unsatisfactory
results  by  both  British  empiricism  and  German  rationalism.  This  refutation,  whose
articulation falls outside the scope of the present essay,9 allows James to portray moral
reflection  as  an  activity  that  is  at  the  same  time  descriptive  of  our  moral  life  and
normatively inspired.10 The kind of descriptions James has in mind picture human beings
as agents and their moral ideas as emerging from their experiences and practices. James
is describing not what human beings are, but rather what human beings do. Furthermore,
he is describing not what they do according to some principle of aiming at some result,
but what they do of themselves when following a certain idea or responding to a certain
experience.
13 James’ criticism of moral theories as pieces of moral reasoning attached from the outside
to the concrete life of human beings is precisely directed against the ‘illusory comfort of
an external standpoint’11 from which to assess our moral life. Moral reflection aims at the
understanding of our moral experiences as they are displayed in our ordinary practices,
and thus  it  must  be  as  tentative  and experimental  as  the moral  life  in  which those
practices take place. The criticism of a moral position cannot be made from a standpoint
that is external to the moral life in which it is embedded, but only from the internal, as a
failure to meet its own standards of rationality. However, far from being a concession to
relativism, this is a point about the kind or realism James is canvassing. Claiming that in
order to criticize a certain moral position you must be embedded in a certain form of life,
that  is  be able to see things in a  certain way,  does not  commit  us  to picture moral
criticism as beyond the limit of rational discourse, since being embedded in a certain
form of life is precisely what our moral criticism is about. The inability to engage in this
form of criticism is what James calls ‘moral blindness,’ and it is connected with James’
characterization  of  how  we  picture  the  attainment  of  truth  in  morality.  So  its  full
articulation must wait till section 8, when the stage will be set with all the necessary
elements.
14 A first indication into the anti-foundational motif of the essay is traceable in James’ few
but significant considerations about moral skepticism. In the second paragraph of MPML
he writes that moral skepticism, or rather the ethical skeptic, is not an acceptable moral
position which we can discuss at a reflective level, since by denying the very existence of
a shared moral reality it cuts itself off from moral discourse altogether. He writes
[f]irst of all, what is the position of him who seeks an ethical philosophy? To begin
with,  he  must  be  distinguished  from  all  those  who  are  satisfied  to  be  ethical
sceptics. He will not be a sceptic; therefore so far from ethical scepticism being one
possible fruit  of  ethical  philosophizing,  it  can only be regarded as that  residual
alternative  to  all  philosophy  which  from  the  outset  menaces  every  would-be
philosopher who may give up the quest discouraged, and renounce his original aim.
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That aim is to find an account of the moral relations that obtain among things,
which will weave them into an unity of a stable system, and make the world what
one may call a genuine universe from the ethical point of view.12
15 Although James will  characterize at  more depth this provisional  definition of  ethical
philosophy – what here I am calling moral reflection – in the course of the essay, here he
is claiming that the appreciation of a shared moral life is a precondition on which moral
reflection bears, and thus that moral skepticism falls outside of the scope of the aims of
MPML. The moral skeptic avoids his responsibility to take part in the moral community,
and  thus  his  attitude  raises  other  kinds  of  questions  and  considerations  than  those
tackled in MPML.13 In fact, in the essay James is interested in carving out what moral
reflection could look like from the very inside of its exercise, wary of the commonest
mistakes committed by those philosopher who understand their own reflective activity as
the imposition of some order of values –whatever their nature– on reality. He continues
by saying that
[t]he subject matter of his study is the ideals he finds existing in the world; the
purpose which guides him is this ideal of his own, of getting them into a certain
form.14
16 The two ideals, the one(s) guiding moral reflection –and the moral philosopher beyond it–
and  the  one(s)  guiding  the  moral  life  –and  the  moral  subjects  animating  it–  are  of
different kinds, and thus the relationship between the two cannot be symmetrical. If in
fact we were to throw the ideal of moral reflection inside those of the moral life it would
suffocate them, smothering the moral life itself. Abstract principles of systematization,
such as those expressed in moral principles, violate the very tentative nature of moral
facts and experiences, as they are articulated in our ordinary moral lives. Robert Talisse
and Micah Hester have beautifully put this point. While discussing James’ conception of
‘moral fact,’ they write
[J]ames’ commitment to lived experience brings with it a series of philosophical
implications  […]  The  principal  objective  of  radical  empirical  philosophy  is  to
“return to life”; that is, to bring philosophical ideas and habits consciously to bear
on our lives. Among the irreducible components of our lived experience is what we
shall  call  ‘moral experience.’  That is,  our daily transactions with others and the
world  features  a  decidedly  moral  dimension.  Just  as  the  world  forces  us  to  hold
beliefs  and thus  to  act,  we are  likewise  compelled  to  make judgments,  and the
elements  of  experience  that  compel  them,  are  as  real  as  any  other  aspect  of
experience.  Hence  your  visual  experience  of  the  ink  spot  on  this  page  which
comprise this very sentence is, on the view of the radical empiricist, on a par with
your  judgment  that  your  favorite  painting  is  a  work of  beauty,  your  feeling  or
regret at the remembrance of a missed opportunity to do good, and your repulsion
to  the  idea  of  the  unnecessary  suffering  of  innocents.  Unlike  traditional
philosophical  systems,  which  attempt  either  to  reduce  moral  experience  to
something more scientifically manageable such as pleasure and pain, or to elevate
moral  experience  to  something  other-worldly,  supernatural,  and  as  such
inexplicable,  the  radical  empiricist  bids  us  to  confront  the  facts  of  experience
directly  and  on  their  own  terms.  This  follows  from the  basic  tenets  of  radical
empiricism.15
17 The authors continue by showing how it is this peculiar understanding of moral facts that
allows  James  to  portray  ethics  in  anti-foundational  terms,  as  an  ongoing  activity  of
rethinking  our  practices  rather  than  one  of  trying  to  fix  them  by  inscribing  their
possibility into some moral principle. What is at stake in moral reflection is our very
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perspective on those facts articulating our moral experiencing, and thus it should have a
character that is as open as the facts it tries to account for. They write
[e]xperience is too complex and the universe is too rich and varied to allow capture
by  a  few philosophical  maxims.  James  rejection  of  the traditional  philosophical
aspiration  for  a  comprehensive  moral  theory,  however,  does  not  constitute  an
abandoning of the fundamental question, How ought we to live? In fact, on James’
view this question becomes all the more vital precisely because we cannot rely upon
tidy philosophical theories for quick-fix solutions to moral dilemmas. We must act
in the absence of moral certainty; thus, the question of how to live becomes crucial.
So, how does James approach the question of how we ought to live? To answer this,
it is important to recognize that James’ rejection of traditional moral theory is in
essence a refusal to see the fundamental concern of moral philosophy primarily
upon individual acts […] [T]he principal focus of Jamesian moral philosophy is life,
not merely individual actions,  and actions are on James’ view the expression or
manifestation  of  our  habits,  and our  habits  are  formed from our  more  general
attitude  toward  life,  not  towards  specific  events.  This  attitude  is  what  James
sometimes refers to as our ‘mood.’16
18 A major outcome of this understanding of the entanglement of moral reflection and the
moral life is that the focus of ethics must be the whole life of human beings: their visions
and attitudes, and not only their preferences that they express at the moment of choice.17
Given that this is so, the relationship moral reflection should entertain with the moral life
cannot be one of foundation. According to James a piece of moral philosophy must be
suggestive rather than prescriptive: it must conveys the depths and the trivialities of our
moral experiences, rather than prescribing which course of action should be appropriate
accordingly to some alleged moral principle. As James writes in the introduction of Talks
to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals
[t]he science of logic never made a man reason rightly and the science of ethics (if
there be such a thing) never made a man behave rightly. The most such science can
do is to help us to catch ourselves up and check ourselves, if we start to reason or to
behave wrongly; and to criticize ourselves more articulately after we have made
mistakes.18
19 A  philosophical  account  of  morality  aims  at  questioning  the  grounds  of  our  moral
practices by describing the way and the conditions through which we endorse or reject
such practices. When doing moral philosophy we do something different from offering
theories: we try to make sense of the practices surrounding our judgment of values and
our attribution of significance. In the next section I shall venture into the very dialectic of
MPML, in order to present its structure and arguments. Once read resolutely19 – and in the
light of James’ considerations about the nature of truth and mindedness that he explores
in his writings on pragmatism and the philosophy of mind – the essay conveys a precise
picture of the shape morality should take in order to entertain a profitable relationship
with the moral life it should address.
⁂
20 James was suspicious about theories, because of their tendency to force the varieties of
experiences under a single and often misleading category. What is interesting in theories
is rather what lies beneath them: that is, facts. This internal resistance of facts to theories
is even more significant in the ethical domain, where the ‘trail of the human serpent’ is
more than ever pronounced. In On Some Hegelism James writes
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[i]n  the  exceedingness  of  the  facts  of  life  over  our  formulas  lies  a  standing
temptation at certain times to give up trying to say anything adequate about them,
and to take refuge in wild and whirling words which but confess our impotence
before their ineffability.20
21 The language of theories (‘our formulas’) is inadequate to account for the facts of life, and
James denounces the ‘standing temptation’ to give up taking those facts in their own terms,
and take refuge in words that could capture such a variety. This insight acquires the
utmost importance in the ethical discourse, where moral theories have the presumption
to regulate the varieties of moral facts from the outside, missing in this way the tentative
character of the moral experiences in which they are embedded. MPML opens with the
opposite auspice that there will be no ethical theory, and thus no ethical truth, until
there will be human experiencing. Theories of morality tend to prescribe which facts are
relevant for moral assessment, and how to individuate them.21 James contends that this
violates our very moral phenomenology: we do not experience values as filling or fitting
some pre-experiential order, and their truth responds only to human standards as they
are set in the course of our practices. James writes in the opening of the essay
[t]he main purpose of this paper is to show that there is no such thing possible as
an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance. We all help to determine
the content of ethical philosophy so far as we contribute to the race’s moral life. In
other words, there can be no final truth in ethics any more than in physics, until
the last man has had his experience and said his say. In the one case as in the other,
however, the hypotheses which we now make while waiting, and the acts to which
they prompt us,  are among the indispensable conditions which determine what
that “say” shall be.22
22 Since morality, in order to specify its very contents, has to wait on experience, moral
reflection will take its course from the analysis of such experiences as they are lived in
the course of the moral lives in which they are lodged. According to James in ethics there
are three questions that must be kept apart, and thus three kinds of investigations can be
addressed in respect to our moral life: the psychological question about the origin of our
moral ideas, the metaphysical question about the meaning of our moral words, and the
casuistic question about the measure of goods which human beings recognize. In order to
start  appreciating the  anti-foundational  character  of  James’  essay,  it  is  important  to
notice that all these different investigations are raised about our common moral practices
and not from sideways-on: these investigations make sense only because our moral life is
shaped in a  certain way.  Had we been different  from how we actually are,  different
questions would have arisen.23 Moral reflection will thus take its course from the inside of
our moral life in order to assess its strategies, presuppositions and shortcomings. Read in
this way, the central parts of the essay present various aspects of our moral life, with an
overview of the difficulties peculiar to each aspect of it. The role of the moral philosopher
is  a  descriptive  one,  and  consists  in  accounting  at  a  reflective  level  how we  fail  to
appreciate  this  variety  if  we  portray  our  moral  life  as  the  establishment  of  moral
principles independently from our activities of endorsement and valuing the relevant
moral experiences.  Franzese,  in the book mentioned in note 1,  shares a similar anti-
foundational  reading  of  James’  moral  philosophy,  but  develops  this  intuition  in  a
different direction since he reads the essay in totally negative terms, while I read it as
containing both negative and positive instructions. Our disagreement, at bottom, is about
the  method  of  MPML:  while  agreeing  that  James  meant  it  not  to  be  read  as  an
advancement of a moral theory, Franzese reads the central sections of the essay as the
demonstration  of  the  unavoidable  ‘dead  ends’  characterizing  any  metaphysical,  and
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casuistic foundation of morality – since, as the dialectic of those sections would show,
each of  the  principles  advanced is doomed to  failure due to  their  clash with the  a-
posteriori character of our moral life – I, on the other hand, read them as the discussion
of the different aspects of our moral life deserving a special attention. Both Franzese and
myself agree that in the essay James is critical of a certain way of doing moral philosophy
as the advancement of philosophical requirements on our very moral phenomenology
from the above, but while I take those sections as together an exploration and a rescue of
some aspects of our moral life from a deceived way of looking at them, Franzese takes
them as the exposition of three variations of the foundational project James wants to
debunk. Although attractive, Franzese’s reading expunges any interesting role for moral
reflection, while I think that the whole point of the essay is precisely that of carving out
an understanding of moral reflection that, once it has lost its foundational aspirations, is
congenial  to the  character  of  our  moral  lives.24 I  shall  now  sketch  how  James
accomplishes that in the essay.
23 The psychological question examines the nature of our moral ideas, whereas under this
label James groups both our moral perceptions and our moral sensibility. This question
has been explored in depth by both the intuitionist and the evolutionist school. James
pays tribute to the associationist tradition for its emphasis on the empirical roots of our
moral  distinctions,  however  criticizing  the  idea  that  the  mechanism  of  association
exhaust all there is to say about the nature of moral ideas. There are, in fact, many ideas
that cannot be described in terms of mere association between states of affairs and simple
sensation of pleasure or pain. James writes that,
[t]he more minutely psychology studies human nature, the more clearly it  finds
there traces of secondary affections, relating the impressions of the environment
with one another and with our impulse in quite different ways from those mere
associations  of  coexistence  and  succession  which  are  practically  all  the  pure
empiricism can admit.25
24 The same could be said of our moral perceptions,  whose importance in James’ ethics
cannot  be  underestimated:  “[a]  vast  number  of  our  moral  perceptions  […]  deal  with
directly felt fitness between things, and often fly in the teeth of all the pre-possessions of
habit  and  presumptions  of  utility.”26 James  is  claiming  that  our  moral  ideas  and
perceptions have a special cognitive character that cannot be reduced to considerations
of utility assessed on the basis  of  past  experiences.  Moral  ideals bring with them an
element of  novelty,  because it  is  only through embracing them that we envision the
distinctive  character  of  a  certain  situation.  For  example,  betrayal,  from  a  detached
description, would include both the facts involved and their consequences – in terms of
pleasure  and  pain  –  on  the  subjects  involved,  but  not,  for  example,  its  character  of
seriousness. What has gone missing is the distinctive contribution that our endorsement
of such an idea or perception confers on their moral character. The examples of these
secondary perceptions given by James are diverse, spanning from ‘the sense for abstract
justice,  the  passion  for  higher  philosophical  consistencies,  the  feeling  of  the  inward
dignity of certain spiritual attitudes and of the essential vulgarity of others.’ James writes
[t]he nobler thing tastes  better,  and that is  all  that we can say.  “Experience” of
consequences  may  truly  teach  us  what  things  are  wicked,  but  what  have
consequences to do with what is mean and vulgar?27
25 That one state of affairs (or an action) is wicked or wrong can be told just by looking at
the consequences of its happening, while that something is mean or vulgar can be told
only by looking at how that situation appears to someone with a certain character – one
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who can taste its ignobility.  This distinction between the evaluation we can give of a
certain state of affairs (or an action) on the basis of its consequences, and the one we can
give according to the character of the agent has immediate ethical consequences: while in
the  first  case  we  refer  to  states  of  things  or  actions  (roughly:  outcomes)  and  their
relationship with some alleged principle (of goodness or rightness), in the second case we
refer to what the subject envisions and how he pictures the situation in hand or the
action.  James portrays this  contrast  as  one between the evaluation of  how things or
action are – in terms of their consequences – and how one sees them – in terms of the
involvement the subject has with the situation or the action in hand. In the one case we
merely describe how things are arranged or which actions are undergone and evaluate
them according to some principle (as for example the association of such states of affairs
or actions and sensations of pleasure and pain felt in past experiences), while in the other
we describe how a person arranges things together or which action is expressive of one’s
stance in respect to the relevant situation. According to James, the importance of these
thick28 ethical concepts consists not only in their being descriptive, but rather in the kind 
of  description they provide  of  a  certain  situation or  action.  Ethical  concepts  do  not
merely mirror some past experiences,  but rather their endorsement helps create the
peculiar moral character of the situation under description. To take the case of courage:
by  picturing  a  certain  conduct  as  courageous  we  do  not  merely  describe  what  a
courageous person ought to do in a certain situation, but also the very stance that person
has on the relevant facts, which determines their worth. By being courageous an agent
establishes the truth conditions of a certain moral evaluation, since it is only when a
courageous stance is  actively endorsed that  the moral  salience of  a  certain situation
become assessable. It is this very agential description that is out of view from a detached
perspective in which what we describe are merely the consequences of a certain idea and
their relation with the past experiences in which that idea has been realized in order to
assess its value.
26 James is claiming two things at once: he is both claiming that all consequences can tell us
is how present experiences relate with past ones while instead moral ideas are also future
oriented, and that, in virtue of this fact, moral ideas or perceptions are not merely copies
of past experiences, but rather they are more the expression of the peculiar stance we can
take on future experiences. James articulates these points by saying that
[p]urely inward forces are certainly at work here. All the higher, more penetrating
ideas are revolutionary. They represent themselves far less in the guise of effects of
past experience than in that of  probable causes of  future experience,  factors to
which the environment and the lessons it has so far taught us must learn to bend.29
27 For our discourse it is important to note how James shifts the terms of the psychological
question  from those  in  which  it  has  been  framed in  modern  moral  philosophy:  the
opposition  is  not  one  between  experiences  and  intuitions,  but  rather  one  between
different genealogies about how values are grasped within experience. According to both
classical empiricism and intuitionism this aspect of morality is portrayed in terms of
discovery, that is by showing how our moral notions results either from how facts are
arranged together,  or from some alleged special  sense through which we grasp their
character.  On the  other  hand,  according  to  James’  radical  empiricism this  aspect  of
morality is portrayed in terms of invention, that is by showing how our moral notions
represent the kind of stance we can take toward certain facts.  James claims that the
proper source of moral value lies within one’s capacity to take a peculiar stance toward
the relevant aspects of the world. Here James, as it will become clearer later in the essay,
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is not claiming that we are the sources of values – as the majority of readers misleadingly
interpreted him –, but rather that the capacity to grasp values depends on us. It is by
acting in the relevant ways that we pay tribute to the values of certain aspects of the
world,  which but for such an active endorsement would be idle.  According to James,
values,  like  facts,  are  in  the  world,  but  it  is  only  when a  peculiar  engaged stance  is
endorsed  that  their  reality  is  fully  in  place.  Actions  and  agency  are  not  internal
happenings,  but  rather  they  are  factive  bearings  on  the  world.  Thus,  the  moral
proprieties  to  which we refer  when making moral  judgments  and performing moral
actions do not take their value from some internal happenings – such as a projection of
our sentiments or feelings on a brute world –, but rather their exercise in the world creates
the  conditions  of  moral  value.  James  portrays  this  agential  stance  as  inventive,  and
contrasts it with an unengaged one according to which the origin of our moral ideas is
portrayed as an instance of discovery.30 Why this stance has to be inventive, and how it
relates with the truth of the facts experienced, is addressed later in James’ essay within
the discussion of  the other two aspects  of  moral  reflection.  Let  me now pass  to the
exposition of the second aspect: the metaphysics of moral words.
28 The importance of words and language in morality has been the main preoccupation of
moral philosophers working in the analytic tradition, especially in its first fifty years of
life. A major theme running through this tradition is the idea that by investigating the
ways in which we talk and the words we use it  could be possible to understand the
character of our moral ideas. The leading idea beyond the so-called linguist turn was that
philosophical  problems  were  at  bottom linguistic  problems,  so  that  by  investigating
moral language – intended as a peculiar strand of the larger linguistic discourse – we
could unravel the nature of our moral life.31 James shares the concern for the way in
which our words and language shape our philosophical inquiries and our lives. In the
Principles James claims that the reason beyond a distorted comprehension of our mental
phenomena lies in the use of an inappropriate language to describe it. Since the language
we employ in describing both ourselves and our experiences is dominated by nouns and
refers primarily to objects,  we have a distorted perception of  both.  James’  diffidence
toward  language  springs  from  its  inability  to  account  for  the  personal  and  fringe
character of experience; in fact both our subjective states and the description we use to
refer to our practices of knowledge are expressed in a language that hides their nature, a
language which, by resembling the middle-sized objects of the outer world, is at risk of
jeopardizing the very nature of our experiencing. James complains that “[i]t is hard to
focus our attention on the nameless, and so there results a certain vacuousness in the
descriptive parts of most psychologies.”32 The empiricist tradition is responsible for the
idea according to which for every discrete mental state there is a word corresponding for
it;  so conceived,  language would form a comprehensive description of  our inner life.
However,  this  conception of  language overlooks the fact  that  introspection reveals  a
stream of sensations and thoughts that are not reducible to what James calls ‘an atomist,
brickbat plan of construction of the mental.’ Regarding the vocabulary we use to describe
our inner states the problem is that, as Gerald Myers wrote:
[t]he  lack  of  a  descriptive  word  can  cause  us  unwittingly  to  overlook  what  is
subjectively present, thus neglecting what may be familiar to all of us if we had
grown up with the appropriate words.33
29 I want to argue that James was well aware that in the moral case we have an analogous
complication, and in the discussion of what he calls the metaphysical question he tackles
directly  this  theme  concerning  moral  language.  James’  treatment  is  pivotal  for  the
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understanding of his conception of moral though as the clarification of our moral life. Our
words and language are in fact revelatory of our moral life, and there is a sense in which
our life with words itself is a moral issue. This theme is approached by James in two steps:
first by showing the metaphysics underlying our moral terms, and then by discussing its
plausibility. James begins by noticing how the words obligation, good and ill ‘have no
application or relevancy in a world in which no sentient life exists’; such words are empty
and meaningless in a world without any ‘interested spectator.’  I  want to remark that
James’ emphasis here is not on mere sensitivities, as the vast majority of scholars have
argued, but on activity itself. In a world without human beings there could be no moral
notions since nobody would exercise them. Moral sensibilities are important but only in
their very exercise and realization. James claims
[g]oodness, badness, and obligation must be realized somewhere in order really to
exist;  and the first step in ethical philosophy is to see that no merely inorganic
“nature of things” can realize them. Neither moral relations nor the moral law can
swing in vacuo. Their only habitat can be a mind which feels them; and no world
composed  of  merely  physical  facts  can  possibly  be  a  world  to  which  ethical
propositions apply.34
30 In this quotation there are listed all  the ingredients of James’  metaphysics of values,
which, far from being a ‘metaphysics’ in the traditional acceptation of the term, is rather
a metaphysics ex parte subiecti. James in fact argues for his view by means of a series of
thought  experiments  –  which  many  commentators  have  seen  as  close  to  the  ones
Wittgenstein made in the sections of the Investigations discussing the ‘private language
argument’ – which, instead of laying down some theoretical principle of meaningfulness
for our moral words, indicates how we come to give moral significance to them, and how
those words are revealing of our moral life. James claims that moral words have meaning
only when there is an activity of evaluation lying beneath them; that is only when human
beings exercise their sensibilities by responding to the relevant aspects of  the world
animating them. According to James the truth of moral ideas is not independent from our
thinking them under certain conditions. Furthermore, his interpretation of the Peircean
conception of belief as willingness to act is consistent with the idea that it is only by
actively endorsing a certain value that we establish its reality and truth conditions.35 This
amounts to the claim that the foundation of the metaphysics of values lies in our being
agents. However, this conclusion is not the result of a transcendental argument. This is
clear as we move to the second step of James’ argument, which assess the plausibility of
this achievement by showing its grounding in our concrete moral life.
31 Once it is argued that moral words have a metaphysical footing in the exercise of our
sensibility, James wants to show that this does not commit one to epistemological and
moral solipsism. To do so James, introduces the other key word in our moral vocabulary:
namely, obligation. Once again, his method for assessing its meaning is that of exhibiting
its place and weight in our practices. He asks us to imagine a universe inhabited by only
one human being, and wonders whether in this scenario moral relations would hold or
not. His answer is peremptory:
[i]n such an universe as that it would of course be absurd to raise the question of
whether the solitary thinker’s judgments of good and ill  are good or not.  Truth
supposes a standard outside the thinker to which he must conform.36
32 This  statement  could  sound  untuned,  given  what  has  been  said  so  far.  Is  James
inconsistent here with his previous thoughts, as many commentators have noted while
reading this passage? How is it possible to claim at the same time that we help establish
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the reality of moral notions, and that their truth also requires a standard outside the
thinker to which they must conform? The answer to these questions is built into the
second part of the though experiment, in which James goes on by asking us to imagine
another universe,  now with two human beings – but the same will  hold for any n+1
universe. Now if they ignore each other by being indifferent to their respective attitudes
we would have a ‘moral dualism’ in which ‘no one objective truth, but only a multitude of
subjective opinions, can be found.’ However, this is a quite unsatisfactory situation as
well, since as in the solipsistic scenario, there would be no morality in a robust sense at
all. So far our situation is the following: on the one hand we have established that moral
relations depend on the exercise of our sensibilities, and on the other we have admitted
that such a metaphysical grounding is not sufficient per se to the achievement of a moral
community. James’ solution to this puzzle lies in the characterization of obligation as a
concrete feature of reality realized in our lives, as contrasted to an abstract principle
‘floating in the atmosphere.’  We fall  into the above inconsistency only if  we picture
morality in theoretical terms, as the abstract comparison between the worth of different
states of affairs. If otherwise we conceive moral obligation in practical terms, that is as
the expression of the claims actually made by human beings, we can hold together the
idea that the exercise of our sensibilities is the source of moral notions and that their
truth  conditions  are  not  exhausted  in  their  abstract  conceivability  or  desiderability.
James writes,
[l]ike positive attributes good and bad, the comparatives ones better or worse must
be realized  in  order  to  be real.  If  one ideal  judgment be objectively  better  than
another,  that  betterness  must  be  made  flesh  by  being  lodged  concretely  in
someone’s  actual  perception  […]  Its  esse  is  percipi,  like  the  esse  of  the  ideals
themselves between which it obtains.37
33 Here James is refuting a deceptive picture of morality whose a priori character clashes
with the a posteriori character of our concrete moral lives. In order to grasp the nature of
moral claims we must look to the way persons actually hold their moral notions and
question  those  of  others.  However,  James  acknowledges  the  existence  of  some
impediments that endanger our comprehension of the nature of our attribution of values
– some of which are of a linguistic nature. In this direction James writes that
[t]here is an inevitable tendency to slip into an assumption which ordinary men
follow when they are disputing with one another about questions of good and bad.
They imagine an abstract moral order in which the objective truth resides; and each
tries to prove that this pre-existing order is more accurately reflected in his own
ideas that in those of his adversary. It is because one disputant is backed by this
over-arching abstract order that we think the other should submit.38
34 This human tendency can be contrasted by an accurate description of the way in which
such attitudes arise. According to James there is a close correspondence between moral
claims and obligations, since
[t]he moment we take a steady look at the question, we see not only that without a
claim actually made by some concrete person there can be no obligation, but that
there is some obligation wherever there is a claim […]. Every de facto claim in so far
forth? an obligation.39
35 However, it is hard to realize such an identity since we tend to reverse the order of logical
priority between a claim and its obligatory weight. In fact we are prone to think that
before advancing a claim we have to assess the conditions of its moral legitimacy, but this
means picturing the validity of the claim, and thus its obligatory character, as depending
on something additional to its mere existence. But what else, James asks, could count as
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an obligation if not something actually desired? The point here is metaphysical: before
something  is  actually  claimed,  there  is  nothing  on  which  obligation  can  intervene.
According to James’ moral psychology, it is interest and not desires or pleasure that lies
at the cornerstone of our moral psychology: interests denote the activity of attention to
those facts which fit our mental structure and so arouse positive feelings of adequacy
between mind and world. It is because there are certain facts in the world prompting
one’s sensibility (through the mechanisms of selective interest plus attention) that one
acts in a certain way and feels the relevant pleasure. According to this picture morality
will thus consists in acquiring the relevant ideas by being attentive to the relevant facts.
In such an understanding moral objectivity, a “standard outside the thinker,” will arise
only if there is a demand for it. And such a demand will arise only if the sentient beings in
the universe, rather than being indifferent to one another, respond to their respective
demands. James writes
[t]he only force of appeal to us, which either a living God or an abstract ideal order
can wield, is found in the “everlasting ruby values” of our own human hearts, as
they happen to beat responsive and not irresponsive to the claim […] Wherever
[actually living] minds exist, with judgments of good and ill, and demands upon one
another, there is an ethical world in its essential features .40
36 Goods are constituted by demands, and moral objectivity is a matter of taking account of
such demands by being responsive to them. James argues that to ask for an external
legitimacy of objectivity means missing the very point of advancing a claim: the only
thing that could hinder the endorsement of  a claim is  another claim.  This brings us
straight to the casuistic question, whose subject matter is the analysis of our ways of
weighting claims and goods.
37 It is by discussing this aspect of morality that James’ criticism of moral theory appears
more clearly.  His  dissatisfaction with ethics  conceived ‘in  the  old-fashioned absolute
sense of the term’ is due to its theoretical, as opposed to practical, inspiration. In this
section  James  reflects  on  the  role  of  the  moral  philosopher  in  facing  the  moral
disagreements spreading in our societies. James observes that the philosopher’s aim is
that of getting ‘a system of  truth’  among moral ideas.  Given the multiplicity of values
claimed in  our  pluralistic  societies,  James  concludes  that  the  most  acceptable  moral
principle is that whose endorsement could satisfy as many demands as possible at the
least cost. This utilitarian inspired conclusion, however, seems a dead end as an answer to
the casuistic question, unless we characterize what kind of moral principle it provides.
James takes into consideration the strategies adopted by the most important schools of
philosophy,  and claims that they share an underlying principles:  they think that the
solution to the casuistic  question can be resolved by reducing the varieties of  goods
claimed to some more simple categories, since, in this scenario, if
[i]t  were found that all  goods quâ goods contained a common essence,  then the
amount of this essence involved in any one good would show its rank in the scale of
goodness, and order could be quickly made.41
38 James finds this solution – variously advanced by intuitionism, hedonism, divine law, and
even Darwinism – quite unsatisfactory because of their common description of a society
whose morality is already inscribed in some abstract principle to which our mind ought
to aim – this being what we intuitively grasp, what would pleasure us, what the divinity
we are committed to command us, or what fits best for our survival. However, according
to James this is a paltry description of the place of truth in our moral lives,  since it
pictures the truth of our moral claims as grounded on something outside experience,
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conferring  on  it  a  normative  character.  Further,  it  contrasts  with  our  very  moral
phenomenology, which, given the varieties of claims expressed in our moral experiences,
can barely accept the existence of a single scale of evaluation. James writes
[t]he elementary forces in ethics are probably as plural as those of physics are. The
various ideals have no common character apart from the fact that they are ideals.
No single abstract principle can be so used as to yield to the philosopher anything
like a scientifically accurate and genuinely useful casuistic scale.42
39 James claims that a way out of the casuistic dilemma can be envisioned only by getting rid
of this image of morality as the struggling for an abstract principle of goodness. The
casuistic question is ‘tragically practical’ – since, as James notes, if it was only a theoretical
problem about ‘imaginable systems of goods’ it would hardly have been raised at all, and
thus its resolution should be practical as well. However, James argues that what hinders
us from pursuing this resolution is the fact that
[w]e are blinded to the real difficulty of the philosopher’s task by the fact that we
are born into a society whose ideals are largely ordered already. If we follow the
ideal which is conventionally highest, the others which we butcher either die and
do not return to haunt us; or if they come back and accuse us of murder, everyone
applauds  us  for  turning  to  them  a  deaf  ear.  In  other  words,  our  environment
encourages us not to be philosophers but partisans.43
40 Moral principles, when we think of them as the outcome of a society whose values are
already fixed outside experiencing, lead to moralism and parochialism, which are the two
extremes of the very same intellectualistic and foundational conception of morality. It is
in this context that James advances the alleged utilitarian principle of maximization,
which,  uncritically  taken,  is  displayed  as  James’  grounding  moral  principle.  James
actually claims that
[s]ince everything which is demanded is by that fact a good, must not the guiding
principles for ethical philosophy (since all demands conjointly cannot be satisfied
in this poor world) be simply to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can? That
act must be the best act, accordingly which makes for the best whole in the sense of
awakening the least sum of dissatisfaction. In the casuistic scale, therefore, those
ideals must be written highest which prevail at the least cost, or by whose realization
the least possible number are destroyed.44
41 However, this principle is useless if we do not grasp the implications James draws from it.
James’ suggestion is that we have to rethink our relation to this moral principle as an
inventive  one,  in  which the  truth of  our  moral  ideas  is  established by  inventing  the
conditions for their actual realization. He writes
[t]he course of history is nothing but the story of men’s struggles from generation
to generation to find more and more inclusive order. Invent some manner of realizing
your own ideals which will also satisfy the alien demands – that and that only is the
path of  peace!  Following this  path,  society  has  shaken into one sort  of  relative
equilibrium after another by a series of social discoveries quite analogous to those
of science.45
42 Ethics requires experimentations, and like physical science it has an a-posteriori character.
However, unlike scientific discourses,46 its advancements consist in the questioning of past
empirical results and the way in which they were understood by the subjects involved.
What matters in the formation of our moral  ideas is precisely the way in which our
interiority responds to their emergence or decline. He writes
[t]he presumption […] always is that the vulgarly accepted opinions are true, and
the right casuistic order that which public opinion believes […] Every now and then,
however,  someone  is  born  with  the  right  to  be  original,  and  his  revolutionary
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thought or action may bear prosperous fruits […] He may, by breaking old moral
rules  in a  certain practice,  bring in a  total  condition of  things more ideal  than
would have followed had the rules been kept.47
43 Our moral  life is  articulated along moments of  critique and rupture with established
experiences and ideas. James’ emphasis here is on the novelty of our moral ideas, which he
pictures  as  the criterion of  the good life  due to the kind of  stance that  the subject
entertaining them must take on experiences. James writes that “[t]he highest ethical life –
however few may be called to bear its burden – consists at all times in the breaking of
rules which have grown too narrow for the actual case.”48 James’ claim that novelty and
invention lie at the bottom of one’s ethical life is not derived as a metaphysical feature of
our human nature, but rather as the fallout of a certain conception of truth and its place
in  ethics.  This  way  of  thinking  about  moral  reflection  is  in  fact  the  result  of  the
description of our moral life as an inventive practice in which the establishment of moral
truths depends on the exercise of our sensibilities, and not as the recognition of values
established independently from it.49 I will now explore the psychology and epistemology
built into such practices, which represent the philosophical integrations informing the
relationship between ethics and truth that will allow us to appreciate the austere anti-
foundational inspiration and motif in MPML. I will thus come back later to the essay with
all the necessary tools to give it a final assessment.
⁂
44 In MPML James has pictured the kind of stance we must take toward moral ideas as an
inventive one. His conception of truth, far from being at odds with this characterization,
can be understood as an elaboration of the insight that in order to apprehend something
as true we must take an inventive and engaged stance. On the psychological question
James claimed that moral notions are more the expression of new ways of seeing things
than the fruit of past experiences, on the metaphysical question he argued that moral
words have meaning only when there is an activity of endorsement lying beneath them,
while on the casuistic question he stressed the dangerousness of conceiving the truth of
our moral experiences as lying outside our experiencing itself. In his 1907 Lowell lectures
James dedicates most of his exposition to the discussion of the notion of truth and its
relation to experiencing. In it we can find explored the very epistemology and psychology
James had started elaborating at the beginning of his career at Harvard as a professor of
comparative physiology.  The leading thread that is  relevant for our discussion is the
characterization of  truth as  a  state of  mind in which we are inventively engaged in
experiencing.50
45 In the first lecture of Pragmatism we find the groundbreaking assertion that advancing a
philosophical position means committing to the truth of a certain world-view, that is, to
the truth of a certain way of seeing things and being dissatisfied with opposite visions.
This  claim,  made  in  the  context  of  James’  investigation  of  the  role  of  truth  in  the
articulation of philosophical reflection,  can be very instructive for understanding the
place of the notion of truth in our moral lives. Truth here refers to the kind of stance we
can take toward experiencing altogether, one in which we actively commit to the reality
of a certain experience due its capacity to bring us into a satisfactory relation with the
world. Given this first characterization of truth, James goes on to investigate the way in
which such a satisfactory relation can be realized, and the very psychology of the agents
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involved. The picture he is resisting is one in which truth stands for the static property of
our thoughts to represent reality as we find it independently of our human interests,
demands and cravings. He writes
[t]ruth independent; truth that we find merely; truth no longer malleable to human
need; truth incorrigible, in a word; such truth exists indeed superabundantly or is
supposed to exist by rationalistically minded thinkers; but then it means only the
dead heart of the living tree, and its being there means only that truth also has its
paleontology and its ’prescription,’ and may grow stiff with years of veteran service
and petrified in men’s regard by sheer antiquity.51
46 Against  this  characterization  James  advances  a  picture  in  which  truth  is  the  very
expression of our interests, demands and cravings. He contends that ideas become true
insofar as they are endorsed and lived by. There is a plasticity in our experiencing in
which new and old truths fight as opposed working values that we advance to get a
satisfactory image of reality. The identification of truths with goods is dictated by the
very  nature  of  true  ideas:  truth  stands  for  the  active  commerce  between  particular
thoughts  and  experience,  whose  nature  is  not  one  of  usefulness  but  rather  one  of
satisfaction. James writes
[t]ruth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from
good, and coordinate with it […] [i]n this world, just as certain foods are not only
agreeable to our taste,  but good for our teeth,  our stomach, and our tissues;  so
certain ideas  are  not  only  agreeable  to  think about,  or  agreeable  as  supporting
other ideas that we are fond of, but they are also helpful in life’s practical struggles.
52
[t]he truth is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and
good, too, for definite, assignable reasons […] [I]f there be any life that it is really
better we should lead, and if there be any idea which, if believed in, would help us
to lead that life, then it would be really better for us to believe that idea, unless,
indeed, belief in it incidentally clashes with other greater vital benefits.53
47 These are among the passages that have been most fiercely attacked by James’ critics,
who have read into them the identification of truth with mere usefulness, laying down in
this  way  the  foundation  for  the  reading  of  his  moral  philosophy  as  a  defense  of  a
hedonistic variant of utilitarianism. Since true ideas are those which we are pleased to
believe, they say, moral truths consist in what we found pleasant to gain. However, only a
few  lines  below  we  found  James  saying  something  that  undermines  such  an
interpretation and opens the way for more imaginative reading of his position. James
recognizes that his position could appear rather awkward, but only if truths are taken in
the abstract sense, as a hypothesis not grounded in our concrete claims to experience.
But  ‘it  is  evident  that  something  happens  when  you  pass  from  the  abstract  to  the
concrete, that complicates the situation’; in fact, when truths are made flesh the biggest
hindrance they could encounter are other truths resisting them, truths claimed by other
human beings or by ourselves at earlier times. In fact vindicating the human trail on our
practices of  truth does not  to commit James to any idealistic  epistemology,  since he
presents the footing of truths as always grounded in our concrete experiencing. James
characterizes true ideas as those that we can ‘assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify’:
“[t]ruth  is  made,  just  as  health,  wealth  and  strength  are  made,  in  the  course  of
experience.”54 According to this  picture of  truth,  our mind is  always engaged in the
attainment  of  truth.  Our  attitude  toward  truth  is  not  the  static  one  of  mirroring
evidences, but rather that of questioning their ‘cash-value in experiential terms.’ We ask
not ‘given these evidences, am I justified in calling them true?,’ but rather
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[g]rant an idea or belief to be true […] what concrete difference will its being true
make in anyone’s actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will
be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false?55
48 The contrast I am interested in stressing is between a live as opposed to a dead stance we
can take toward experience and thus toward truth. James portrays this contrast by saying
that the reasons for the establishment and recognition of  a certain truth are always
reason for action as guided by truth.  Our agency is expressive of the truths we help
establishing, since we use such and such truths as the very background for our practices.
As James writes, “[o]ur duty to gain truth, so far from being a blank command from out of
the blue, or a ‘stunt’ self-imposed by our intellect, can account for itself by excellent
practical reasons.56 We have truths because we find some objects or idea important and
worth having; truths are expressive of our interests and cravings, and there is no point of
calling a certain idea true if we were insensible and unconcerned for its reality. To this
extent truths are the result of the peculiar posture that our minds can take on reality,
and  their  establishment  is  set  by  an  act  of  endorsement  that  in  its  turn  is  shaped
according  to  our  practical  needs.  James  makes  the  point  by  saying  that  “[b]y  our
inclusions  and  omissions  we  trace  the  field’s  extent;  by  our  emphasis  we  mark  its
foreground and its background; by our order we read it in this direction or in that.”57 In
The Meaning of Truth James explores this idea by showing in which sense the practical
stance from which we assess truths is inventive. James quarrels about the meaning of the
expression ‘agreement with reality,’ which is proposed by his opponents as the key to
understanding the nature of  truth.  He accepts  it  but  widens the boundaries  of  what
‘agreement’ amounts to in a direction that is congenial to our discourse. He claims that
truth is not merely duplicative of reality, since the copy of reality is only one among
many of our interests. What is at stake in our experiencing is the attainment of a fruitful
relation with reality, be it one of copying or not. That of agreement is a wider notion than
both empiricists and rationalists were ready to admit. The problem with both empiricism
and rationalism is that they tried to “weed out the human contribution” from the process
of agreement, picturing it either as the passive exposition of our senses to facts or as the
exemplification of an extra-empirical and necessary accordance between our minds and
Reality. If we get rid of the picture of truth as a relation between our mind and a non-
human – rational or brute – reality, in favor of one in which it is the outcome of our
active commerce with reality, we will achieve the possibility to see how those truths are
at  the  same  time  the  expression  of  our  subjectivity,  and  objectively  assessable  by
reference to  reality.  Our claims of  truth are the expression of  our  point  of  view on
experience and their validity must be assessed from within experiencing itself, resisting
the temptation of postulating any external guarantee for their validity. James claims that
[m]y  universe  is  more  essentially  epistemological.  I  start  with  two  things,  the
objective facts and the [truth] claims, and indicate which claims, the facts being
there, will work successfully as the latter’s substitutes and which will not. I call the
former claims true.58
49 James is not denying that reality is independent from us, but denying that truth is, since
it depends on the very stance we take toward reality. It is our interests and visions that
direct our investigations and determine the truth of certain ideas. There is no outside
standard of truth we ought to follow except that which we establish ourselves in the
course of experiencing. This practice is an inventive one since through experiencing we
re-arrange facts in different and before unimagined ways according to our interests. We
invent  new  truths  by  noticing  overlooked  similarities  between  situations  and
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discriminating differences among the things that were unnoticed before. According to
this picture
[r]eality is an accumulation of our own intellectual inventions, and the struggle for
‘truth’ in our progressive dealings with it is always a struggle to work in new nouns
and adjectives while altering as little as possible.59
50 The only resistance possible to this process is an internal one, and is represented by
previous truths and those held by other human beings. This theme has been explored by
James in different directions,60 but what interests me here are the ethical consequences of
this characterization of truth as invention. This inventive conception of truth is relevant
for ethics since its denial leads to what James has called moral blindness.
⁂
51 This characterization of truth as invention stands in opposition to blindness intended as a
state of mind in which we are unable to establish a meaningful contact with the world
and with other fellow humans due to our unengaged stance. In the essay On a Certain
Blindness in Human Beings James argues that our judgment concerning the worth of things
depends on their hold on our sensibility, and denounces the dangerousness of such a
recognition, which brings with it the incapacity to enter imaginatively in alien visions
and values. This moral blindness consists in a conative as well as in a cognitive failure,
since when we are morally blind toward others’ needs, values and truths we are not only
unable to make sense of their visions and struggles but also of the realities these attitudes
generate. We are blind toward pieces of reality itself, those envisioned by the truth claims
of other human beings. This has tremendous ethical consequences. James remarks
[h]ence the stupidity and injustice of our opinions,  so far as they deal  with the
significance  of  alien  lives.  Hence  the  falsity  of  our  judgments,  so  far  as  they
presume to decide in an absolute way on the value of other persons’ conditions or
ideals.61
52 This failure is presented by James as a failure to occupy an engaged point of view toward
the experiencing of  others,  and toward our own as well.  In fact,  when we portray a
certain experience without questioning the meaning that that very experience has for the
subject having it,  we miss its very truth and significance.  The spectator’s disengaged
stance toward a certain experience condemns her to miss the truth expressed in that
experience. According to James there is a deep entanglement between knowing truths
and feeling experiences, since in order to make an experience come alive in our mind we
have to imagine what it means to endorse it as truth. In order to mark a contrast between
an engaged and a detached stance towards truths, James says
[t]he spectator’s judgment is sure to miss the root of the matter, and to possess no
truth. The subject judged knows a part of the world of reality which the judging
spectator fails to see, knows more while the spectator knows less; and, wherever
there is conflict of opinion and difference of vision, we are bound to believe that
the truer side is the side that feels the more, and not the side that feels the less.62
53 We are morally blind when we fail to see how the sources of truth are nested in the very
meaning those experiences have for those who have them. When we fail to realize this
fact, our perception of reality itself is poor and our judgment about it restricted. The
essay presents a series of examples taken from literature and personal records in which
there is a failing in grasping the nature of truth claims caused by a unengaged or dead
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stance toward alien experiences and meanings,  and in the conclusion James draws a
lesson of method which echoes the very closing of MPML. Let me quote both:
[h]ands off: neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any
single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from
the peculiar position in which he stands […] [I]t is enough to ask of each of us that
he  should  be  faithful  to  his  own  opportunities  and  make  the  most  of  his  own
blessings, without presuming to regulate the rest of the vast field.63
[b]ooks on ethics, therefore, so far as they truly touch the moral life, must more
and  more  ally  themselves  with a  literature  which  is  confessedly  tentative  and
suggestive rather than dogmatic – I mean with novels and dramas of the deeper
sort,  with  sermons,  with  books  on  statecraft  and  philanthropy  and  social  and
economical reform. Treated in this way ethical treatises may be voluminous and
luminous as well; but they never can be final.64
54 Both quotations warn us to beware of unimaginative and narrow understandings of the
way in which our moral life is animated by the notion of truth. The conclusion of On a
Certain Blindness invites us to pay attention to the varieties and plurality of ways in which
experiences speaks to us, while the closing of MPML, given this characterization of moral
truths, stresses the anti-foundational and elucidative character of moral reflection. In the
essay What Makes a Life Significant James brings even tighter these two instructions by
opposing the inventive stance of truth to the one of intolerance characterizing moral
blindness:  an  epistemological  failure  amounts  to  a  moral  failure,  and vice  versa.  The
opening of the essay is trenchant:
[i]n my previous talk, ‘On a Certain Blindness,’ I tried to make you feel how soaked
and shot-through life is with values and meanings which we fail to realize because
of our external and insensible point of view. The meanings are there for the others,
but  they are  not  there  for  us.  There  lies  more than a  mere interest  of  curious
speculation  in  understanding  this.  It  has  the  most  tremendous  practical
importance. I wish that I could convince you of it as I feel it myself. It is the basis of
all our tolerance, social, religious, and political.65
55 A vivid way to make this point is James’ example of the lover’s perception of his beloved:
when we do not appreciate the beauty that a lover sees in his beloved, James argues, we
fail to appreciate something that is true. Our failing consists in the inability to grasp the
reality of a state of affairs that is claimed and endorsed as true by someone, who responds
to the truth of his ideas by taking them seriously. Our blindness is a failure to understand
the way in which truths are recognized, endorsed, and lived by. In the second part of the
essay, after another round of scenes of instruction about a variety of different conducts of
life taken from personal experiences and literary works, James suggests we read such
conducts as expressive of moral truths. The different lives of human beings are guided by
different moral truths, which James here calls ‘ideals.’ Ideals are what prompt our agency
to commitment, and their perception prompts us to appraise them and legitimate their
validity. To understand an ideal means to understand a person’s vision, and make sense of
his actions and experiences. James’ characterization of ideals is twofold:
[a]n ideal […] must be something intellectually conceived, something of which we
are not unconscious, if we ’have it; and it must carry with it that sort of outlook,
uplift, and brightness that go with all intellectual facts. Secondly, there must be
novelty in an ideal, – novelty at least for him whom the ideal grasps. Sodden routine
is incompatible with ideality, although what is sodden routine for one person may
be ideal novelty for another.66
56 These two features of ideals represent the two poles around which all the dialectics of
MPML turns: ideals and truths are states of mind that must be actively endorsed in order
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to  exist,  and  their  grasp  requires  novelty  and  invention.  Ideals  express  the  kind  of
engagement we take in our experiencing, and characterize our intellectual as well as our
affective life. Ideals are novel in the sense that their establishment consists in a creative
act, and the failure to commit to the reality of ideals denotes a deficiency in one’s moral
life. Such a deficiency is not merely sentimental, but also cognitive, because in being blind
toward the reality of ideals we are blind toward aspects of the world whose significance
requires our active engagement. Ruth Anna Putnam, in stressing the cognitive character
of the novelty of ideals and its relevance for the ethical life, writes that “[o]ne’s ideals
may contain novelty in a second sense; one may envisage changing the world, changing
the way the world would go without one’s intervention.67
57 By actively endorsing some ideals,  and the truths they convey, we help to shape the
values circulating in the world. Without such an active endorsement such values would be
frustrated. The establishment of the truth of a certain moral idea(l) requires one’s taking
an active stance toward the relevant experiences, and James’ instruction, far from being a
prescription  about  what  kind  of  idea(l)s  to  promote,  is  rather  an  exhortation  to
acknowledge  their  grounding  in  the  pragmatic  conception  of  truth  as  invention.  By
endorsing some values over others we make a choice that is of ethical significance, and
the role of moral reflection is precisely that of indicating the inventive character of such
an endorsement in order to dissolve the difficulties arising when we unwittingly portray
it as a move that does not involve a personal contribution on our part.
⁂
58 In the former two paragraphs I’ve sketched the dialectic of MPML and James’ theory of
truth animating it, claiming their deep intertwinement. In this paragraph I will try to
show in which way the anti-theoretical inspiration of the essay is entangled with the idea
of  truth as  an inventive state  of  mind that  involves  the active  engagement  of  one’s
interiority. Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam, both in their individual works and in their
joint articles on James,  have stressed this intertwinement and portrayed it  as James’
major  concern and most  important  achievement.  In an interesting essay on some of
James’ philosophical ideas, they write that “[e]arly and late, James’ motivation […] was
ultimately  ethical,  and  his  essays  […]  particularly  “MPML,”  can  play  a  key  role  in
understanding both his pragmatism and his radical empiricism.”68 In the essay they draw
a  compelling  picture  of  how  James’  pragmatism  informs  his  moral  philosophy,  and
present it by saying
[J]ames (as well as Dewey) takes the same approach to ethics as he does to common
sense  and  science.  Here  too,  he  thinks,  there  are  procedures  which  can  be
imperfectly characterized and which might be improved in the course of ethical
inquiry itself. What is not available is a set of final ethical truths or a method by
which they can be discovered. He tries to change our philosophical sensibility, rather
than to replace one foundationalist ethical project with another, on the one hand,
or to convince us that ethics is “non-cognitive,” on the other.69
59 The authors refuse a foundational  reading of  MPML,  and suggest  that  what James is
trying to  do is  not  to  convince  us  about  the validity  of  one theoretical  option over
another, but rather he is trying to change our philosophical – and, most precisely, our
ethical – sensibility and expectations, in order to understand ‘how best to proceed in
ethical inquiry.’ It has been my contention that the way he suggests we proceed is by
unraveling  our  biased  assumptions  about  our  mindedness  and  worldliness,  that  is
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investigating how our moral life is informed by the notion of truth as an inventive mental
state. Here I want to spell out at some greater length the more substantive aspects of this
claim; namely, the idea that our interiority is touched and changed by the ways in which
we pursue truths, and consequently its bearing for ethics.
60 James dedicates many pages of the Principles to the discussion of how our mental – or
inner  –  life  is  profoundly affected by the experiences  we undergo and the ideas  we
entertain. In the texts discussed James insistently returns to this idea by claiming that the
ethical  question  ‘how  ought  I  live?’  does  not  merely  –  nor  principally  –  ask  which
particular actions one should entertain, but rather ‘what mental perspective on the facts
should I take?,’ or ‘which truths should I consider as the background of my experiencing?’
Such questionings  do  involve  a  re-description of  our  mental  life  as  a  move  directly
relevant for the articulation of one’s ethical life. James once remarked in this direction
that ‘thinking is the fundamental moral act’ since ‘a moral act is one which follows from
the acquisition and possession of adequate ideas.’70 For James, holding something as true
requires the exercise of one’s sensibility and understanding, and in moral discourse, as
the dialectic of MPML shows clearly, this entanglement is presented as the condition of
possibility of seeing moral reflection as a form of clarification of our moral life through a
clarification of our life with our moral truths. Ethics deals with truth since it is expressed
in how we perceive and describe ourselves, in how attentive and faithful we are to our
visions and reactions. Registering what appears as valuable requires in the first instance a
kind of re-appropriation of the space of subjectivity. Our life with truths, more than truth
itself, is the primary concern of James, and in MPML this theme is articulated through the
idea that the proper target of moral reflection is our very understanding of the way in
which  we  represent  the  truths  informing  our  moral  lives  –  for  examples,  those
concerning the metaphysical status of our moral ideas or the kind of relationship we
entertain  with  some  moral  principles.  James  claims  that  we  are  accustomed  to  a
superstitious view we must get rid of; he writes
[o]ur ordinary attitude of regarding ourselves as subject to an overarching system
of  moral  relations,  true  “in  themselves,”  is  therefore  either  an  out-and-out
superstition, or else it must be treated as a merely provisional abstraction […] [w]e
inveterately think that something which we call the ‘validity’ of the claim is what
gives to it its obligatory character, and that this validity is something outside of the
claim’s mere existence as a matter of fact. It rains down upon the claim, we think,
from some sublime dimension of being, which the moral law inhabits, much upon
the steel of the compassion-needle the influence of the Pole rains down from the
starry heavens.71
61 The aim of moral reflection is that of ridding ourselves of this and related superstitious
views, and the companion foundational anxieties according to which the moral life is
exemplified in a series of moral principles that we can either fail or succeed in respecting.
By claiming that what must change is our very attitude or sensibility, James re-orients the
whole purpose of moral reflection, shifting the center of interest from moral theory to
the self’s relationship with morality itself. The pragmatic underpinning of this picture of
moral reflection grounds unsurprisingly on the kind of relationship we establish with the
values  and truths  articulating  our  moral  lives.  This  image  of  philosophy and of  the
attainment of truth as animated by our moral concern brings to the fore the semantic
ambiguity of the term ‘ethics’ in all its tension: in James’ thought a conception of ethics as
the inquiry into what is valuable – that however is not limited to the expression of what
we would naturally conceive as moral judgments – coexists with a conception of the
William James on Truth and Invention in Morality
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
24
peculiar engaged stance we should assume toward experience as a whole, as opposed, for
example, to the detached stance of science. The two meanings are deeply intertwined for
James, since being value-blind is a direct consequence of occupying the wrong stance or
attitude towards experience. This polysemy of the term ethics conveys a conception of
moral reflection as involving a change from a detached to an engaged perspective toward
ourselves and the world, a recovering from blindness, and the acknowledgement of the
importance of the cultivation of one’s attention and scrutiny of the truths animating the
ideas  we  find  ourselves  living  by.  Values  are  to  be  found  in  experience,  but  their
perception  depends  on  the  kind  of  stance  we  take  toward  experiencing  itself.  Our
inability to register the importance of a situation, the meaning of a certain discourse or
the truth of a certain world-view is due to our inability to take the right stance toward
those situations, meanings and truths, one from which they appear desirable and alive for
us or those who live them.
62 According to James, we are constantly on the verge of losing this grasp on reality for a
variety of reasons:  because of our depicting the pursuit of truth and meanings as an
activity that doesn’t require the involvement of our personal sensibilities, because of our
inability to acknowledge that ideals, truths and values are the result of the particular
description we make ourselves of reality, and because of the very nature of language
which distorts the image we have of  our inner life;  in James’  words,  because of  our
tendency of ‘taking the usual for granted.’ However, once we have abandoned a picture of
moral values and moral truths as the correspondence of our sensibilities to something
brute or transcendental, in favor of a picture of them in terms of the inventive character
of our experiencing – one which requires a personal inventive experimentation –, a very
different  picture  of  moral  reflection,  one  long  neglected  in  the  recent  history  of
philosophy,  will  be  again  regarded as  respectable.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  moral
psychology of human beings is directly relevant for the understanding of the character of
moral reflection. The achievement of a description of reality that makes values hospitable
in the world requires in the first instance a description of human experiencing as the very
source of truth and values. This is a recurrent theme in James’ philosophy, which he
explores in depth in many occurrences of his intellectual biography, and it finds its most
distinctive voice in MPML. After his 1891 address he never came back to the theme in
these terms, perhaps due to the very poor reaction it generated, and tried instead to re-
affirm its main tenets by following other paths. Although his later ethical writings were
characterized by companion concerns, MPML remains the only theoretical treatment of
this theme, and thus, as such, we ought to read it as a prolegomenon to the various moral
inquiries it suggests we undertake. We should value the relative silence of the essay over
the contents that should characterize moral discourse, since its point is precisely that of
warning us against constricting ourselves in one or another narrow moral possibility,
concentrating instead on the form moral reflection should take. This point, gone utterly
unnoticed in the secondary literature, represents in my opinion the key to understanding
both MPML and his later moral  investigations.  Despite its  apparent abstractness,  this
indication  has  the  most  tremendous  practical consequences,  as  the  essays  on  moral
blindness I briefly quoted testify. These are not the only possible ones, but the point of
MPML is precisely that of indicating the path along which to proceed in doing moral
philosophy, and not that of exhausting its possibilities.
⁂
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63 In this article I have argued that the notions of truth and invention represent the key to
understanding the dialectic of MPML and its instructions about the point and shape of
moral reflection. Once truth is seen as the peculiar engaged stance we can take toward
experiencing, one whose character is inventive rather than passive, the internal tensions
displayed  in  the  discussion  of  the  psychological,  the  metaphysical  and  the  casuistic
question  cease  to  appear  as  such.  In  MPML  James  has  struggled  to  present  the
complexities featuring the relationship between our moral life and moral thought, and
the discussion of its underlying conception of truth has helped us in finding a key to
understanding its dialectics. By resisting a certain picture of truth as ungrounded in our
practices  of  experiencing  we  dismiss  altogether  certain  difficulties  haunting  the
characterization of our moral lives. If read as a piece of moral theory, MPML could appear
rather  unsatisfying,  but  if  this  paper  has  at  least  partially  achieved  its  ambition  of
challenging the grounds of such a reading, then the project of shaping moral reflection
along foundational lines will appear as less appealing. On closer inspection, James’ essay
conveys an interesting conception of moral reflection, whose greatest value consists in its
capacity to shed light on the varieties of  experiences surrounding our moral  life.  Its
point, beyond doubt a Wittgenstenian one, rather than being that of telling what morality
is, is that of showing how to grasp, understand and live with it.
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NOTES
1. Franzese (2008: 3). Although I wholeheartedly agree with the above claim by Franzese, our
readings of MPML diverge in one important aspect: while for him the essay has only a negative
aspiration – namely, that of showing how all foundational projects are doomed to fail – I think
that it conveys a more positive message. Our disagreement amounts to the reading of the method 
of the essay. I will come back on this disagreement later in section 6.
2. It  is  important  to  notice  that  James  was  very  critical  of  the  Benthamite  version  of
utilitarianism,  while  much more  sympathetic  to  John Stuart  Mill’s  version,  which  was  more
attentive to the qualitative distinction between lower and higher pleasures. James’ debt to Mill
runs deep into his intellectual biography, and is acknowledged in the dedication of his most
important work Pragmatism to him.
3. As an aside, whose full articulation would require much more investigation than I can pursue
in the space of this essay, I would like to remark that the matter is even more complicated, given
the presence of an interesting entanglement internal to James’ own rhetoric about the nature of
morality between the relationship of moral reflection with the moral life it should address and
the relationship of MPML with the moral investigations pervading his other writings. That is,
James’ discourse in MPML about the nature of moral thought in respect to the moral life fosters
the very same questionings about the place of this essay in the corpus of his writings. The very
same intellectualistic understanding of the connection between moral reflection and the moral
life affects also the understanding of the connection between MPML and the moral instructions
suffused in his other works. James was deeply upset about the poor response to his lecture essay,
and the reason for this lies in his readers’  – and listeners’  – misunderstanding of both these
entanglements.  He  lamented  such  a  misreading  with  the  very  same  force  with  which  he
complained about  the  misunderstandings  of  his  conception of  truth as  he  portrays  it  in  his
Pragmatism  and  The  Meaning  of  Truth.  I  suspect  that,  in  his  replies  to  these  latter
misunderstandings, James tried to give some instructions to remedy also the former misreading,
and this is precisely because in order to appreciate the arguments advanced in MPML what is
needed is a correct grasp of the picture of truth built into it. This shows, at least, how systematic
and  precise  James’  reflection  was,  and  how  misled  are  those  detractors  who  portray  his
philosophy  as  lacking  of  rigor  in  his  thinking.  The  difficulty  of  appreciating  James’  deep
philosophical sensibility and precision is due to its contrast with the elusiveness of the material
worked on. The sharp mind and arguments of James look watered down by the nature of their
very objects of inquiry, which are by their nature as variegated, fuzzy and motley as the lives in
which  they  are  experienced.  Therefore,  James’  chief,  self-proclaimed  goal,  that  is  ‘the  re-
instatement of the vague [and inarticulate] to its proper place in our mental life’ (James 1890a:
254),  requires a work that is  as much accurate as sophisticated,  one easy to miss due to the
flamboyant character of the trail it must follow to chase its raw materials. This lesson holds both
for his treatment of ethics, and for the understanding of his overall conception of philosophical
activity.  A  resourceful  reading  of  James’  philosophical  project  that  is  attentive  to  these
questionings is C. H. Seigfried (1990), in which the author engages in a thoughtful analysis of
James’ claims to systematicity, of their difficulties, shortcomings and misunderstandings.
4. A rough list of which numbers – in addition to the literature discussed or quoted along the
essay  –  J. K. Roth  1965,  M. R. Slater  2009,  B. Brennan  1961,  A. Edel  1976,  E. K. Suckiel  1982,
G. H. Bird 1997, and J. Campbell 1981.
5. Perry (1935: 250).
6. An analogous move is made by some recent accounts of James’ philosophy. See, for example,
L. Gunnarsson 2010, and D. W. Bjork 1988. Although very interesting both in their general point
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and for their insights into James’ conception of philosophy as therapy, without doubt a major
theme in James’ intellectual biography, these readings tend to portray James’ reflective discourse
to  a  mere  outcome of  his  personal  strivings  and  idiosyncrasies.  Even  though I  think  that  a
detailed acquaintance with James’ life represents a necessary element for the understanding of
many of his ideas, I resist the reduction of the latter to the former. At least, some distinctions
must be traced. In a nutshell, James’ broader considerations about the nature of philosophy and
the motives for philosophizing – the idea that  one’s  temperament is  a  major factor in one’s
philosophical  investigations  –  recalls  an  immediate  connection  between  biography  and
philosophy, so that it is fair to say that when he speaks about them it is not only the philosopher
James speaking, but the very man – and, moreover, he is not speaking only to philosophers, but
to the flesh and blood human beings beneath them animating their thoughts.  However, such
anxieties  are  philosophical  anxieties  bearings  on  our  lives  and  thus  their discussion  should
proceed at a reflective level, even if their objects are the human beings with their questionings as
they  are  expressed  in  their  lives  and  practices.  As  regards  James’  (slightly)  more  limited
considerations  about  the  nature  of  morality,  mindedness  and  worldliness  the  connection
between biography and philosophy must be complicated, and although it is fair to say that some
happenings in James’ life prompted him to some reflections and shaped his way of seeing things,
I  resist  this  as  merely  the  last  thing  to  say  about  them.  There  is  an  activity  of  reflective
underpinning that is beyond the discussion of morality or the nature of the mind, which is both
instigated  by,  and  bears  on,  our  concrete  lives  and  biographies,  but  whose  dialectic  and
investigations  are  philosophical  through  and  through.  Russell  B. Goodman  puts  this  idea
beautifully by saying that James’ complaint that he was ‘unfit to be a philosopher because at
bottom he hates philosophy, especially at the beginning of a vacation, with the fragrance of the
spruces and sweet ferns all soaking him through with the conviction that it is better to be than to
define  your  being’  is  itself  “of  course  […]  a philosophical  statement”  (Goodman 1990:  58).  A
similar concern is voiced by James Conant and Piergiorgio Donatelli about the understanding of
the connection between biography and philosophy in Wittgenstein and in other great authors.
See Conant 2001, and Donatelli (1998: 179-85). It was Wittgenstein himself who, speaking with
Maurice Drury about good philosophical works, responded to Drury’s comment that ‘I  always
enjoy reading William James. He is such a human person,’ by remarking ‘Yes, that is what makes
him a good philosopher; he was a real human being’ (Drury 1984: 121).
7. Gale (1999: 26).
8. Gale (1999: 32). Gale mounts a very elegant and elaborate ‘ladder argument,’ running through
nearly half his book, in which several variants of this principle are given as he brings into his
initial  ‘practical  syllogism’  different  elements  of  James’  thought.  I  can’t  do  justice  to  the
complexity of his argument here, although I will indirectly go back to it later while presenting at
more length my own reading of James’ characterization of truth. I will save a detailed analysis
and confrontation with Gale’s powerful reading of James for another occasion, and I would like to
thank prof.  Gale  for  his  very thoughtful  advices  and guidance during some very stimulating
conversations on our disagreements.
9. For a discussion of this theme see Bernstein 1983, Rorty 1982, Putnam 1995, and Margolis
20072.
10. It is my interpretative claim that James has in mind the kind of normative descriptions Kant
made of human beings in his Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht.  There are some historical
evidences for this claim – collected by Perry in his masterwork on James’ life and thought –
according to which James began reading Kant in his late twenties and early thirties,  and the
Anthropologie was the very first book of Kant he read. The first to remark James’ (and Peirce’s)
debt to Kant was Dewey (1908a, 1925). Whereas Pierce’s debt to Kant is much more widespread
and documented, James’ relationship with Kant is more difficult to ascertain and characterize,
especially  given  James’  harsh  criticism  of  Kant  in  his  published  works.  However,  as  many
William James on Truth and Invention in Morality
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
30
biographers have documented, Kant’s Anthropologie was a book James admired, and which was
very helpful in his early struggles for the elaboration of his own pragmatic conception of human
beings. A very interesting examination of James’ engagements with Kantian themes is given by T.
Carlson 1997.
11. Borrowing the expression used by Alice Crary and Rupert Read to describe Wittgenstein’s
attitude toward the possibility of external elucidations of our human practices.
12. James (1897: 141).
13. Here James has in mind skepticism as it  is has been conceived in the modern, Cartesian,
tradition. However, there are some interesting connections also with Cavell’s characterization of
skepticism. These are addressed by Russell Goodman (1990: ch. 1 & 3).
14. James (1897: 142).
15. Talisse  &  Hester  (2004:  57).  The  authors  present  this  conception  as  a  result  of  James’
philosophical method of radical empiricism, whose connection with his pragmatism is the object
of  many investigations.  Here I  carry out my argument by using resources internal  to James’
pragmatism, making no reference to his radical empiricism, although a parallel point could be
made by exploring James’ conception of experience and experiencing as he pictures it  in his
writing on radical empiricism.
16. Talisse & Hester (2004: 68).
17. This point has been raised in a slightly different way by Ruth Anna Putnam in her discussion
of how to read James’ insights about the role of character in our moral life. She writes “The title
of William James’ only systematic essay in moral philosophy – “The Moral Philosopher and the
Moral Life” – suggests that a serious systematic thought about morality needs to focus on a whole
life” (Putnam 1990: 68).
18. James (1899: 5).
19. The resoluteness is about the kind of reading James requires one to engage in while reading
MPML. I use the term resolute as a reference to the reading that James Conant and Cora Diamond,
among others, gave of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. A resolute reading is one which beware us how to
read a certain text, and in particular how to read its statements in order to get the significance
that the phrasing in which they are expressed tries to convey. For this reason, using the word
resolute does not indicate a kind of interpretation of the text, but rather it points to a program of
comprehension of the text: not what the author is saying, but rather what is he doing. While in
Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus,  as  the authors cited have brilliantly  showed us,  this  methodological
instruction  is  explicit  and  self-standing,  in  James’  MPML the  instruction  emerging  from the
dialectic of the essay can be fully apprehended only in the light of his general conception of
philosophical problems that he fully explores in other text. It is thus my interpretative claim that
in  order  to  understand  the  kind  of  work  James  is  doing  in  MPML  one  must  look  to  his
understanding of the nature of philosophical inquiries –and in particular to its characterization
of the place of truth in morality.
20. James (1897: 204).
21. Cora Diamond wrote extensively on the dangerousness of what she calls ‘a moralization of
morality,’ reading James as an author whose philosophy was driven by similar concerns. See in
particular, Diamond 1997.
22. James (1897: 141).
23. This conception of the philosophical inquiry as the clarification of our activities and forms of
life from the within has been explored at depth by Wittgenstein, who was a reader of James and
praised him for stressing the importance of such an aspect. See Wittgenstein (1959: § 350) and
Wittgenstein  (20094:  II  §  366).  For  a  detailed  analysis  of  Wittgenstein’s  debts  to  James,  see
Goodman 2002. The expression ‘sideways on’ is taken from John McDowell 1979, whose use of it is
inspired by his resourceful reading of Wittgenstein (and Aristotle).
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24. For a critical assessment of the book by Franzese, see Marchetti 2011 where I spell out in
more detail our disagreements as well as our like-mindedness on both this point and the wider
reading of the whole of James’ moral philosophy.
25. James (1897: 143).
26. James (1897: 143).
27. James (1897: 134).
28. The  characterization  of  thick  ethical  concepts  –  and their  difference  from thin  ones  –  is
spelled out by Bernard Williams 1985. The distinction James is drawing here is close to the one
Williams is interested in defending, and also its critical purposes are not unlike, although it is
embedded in a very different conceptual apparatus.
29. James (1897: 134).
30. My  terminological  choices  could  be  misleading,  since  by  speaking  of  ‘invention’  –  and
contrasting it with ‘discovery’ – I  could suggest the idea that here James is claiming that we
‘create’ values. However, I keep the world ‘invention’ because it is the one James uses in these
passages, and here I’m trying to show how James uses it in reference to the stance we can take
toward facts,  one from which their values emerge.  I  would like to thank Akeel Bilgrami,  who
raised some perplexities on my use of ‘invention’ and gave me some useful suggestions to clarify
my own thoughts on the matter. In my understanding of James’ conception of moral values I
have  been  inspired  by  Bilgrami’s  writings  on  enlightenment  and  enchantment,  in which  he
portrays with great clarity and insight the contrast between an enchanted and a disenchanted
conception of values. See, in particular, Bilgrami 2010.
31. For  a  survey  of  these  themes,  together  with  an  interesting  proposal  of  an  alternative
genealogy of their emergence, see Donatelli 2005.
32. James (1890a: 195).
33. Myers (1986: 70).
34. James (1897: 145).
35. This is what Russell B. Goodman, referring to Emerson and the American transcendentalist
movement,  has  called  a  ‘voluntaristic  picture  of  knowledge,’  according  to  which  ‘to  know
something […] one must do something, taking a special attitude or stance’ (Goodman 1990: 56).
‘According to James a precondition for certain kinds of knowing or “communication with the
nature of things” is an act or attitude of the knowing subject’ (Goodman 2002: 70).
36. James (1897: 146).
37. James (1897: 147).
38. James (1897: 148).
39. James (1897: 148).
40. James (1897: 149-50).
41. James (1897: 152).
42. James (1897: 153).
43. James (1897: 154).
44. James (1897: 155).
45. James (1897: 155-6).
46. James, quite reasonably indeed, even relying on a very liberal conception of scientific inquiry,
had a pre-Kuhnian conception of scientific discourse. However, I guess that, accordingly to some
of his own innovative reflections on the character of psychological science and its developments
in  the  nineteen  century,  he  would  have  praised  the  guiding  lines  of  Kuhn’s  insights  about
paradigm changes and the value ladenness of observations as pragmatic ideas. For a brilliant
inquiry into James’ conception of scientific discourse, see Bordogna 2008.
47. James (1897: 157-8).
48. James  (1897:  158).  The  passage  continues  “[w]e  should  seek  incessantly,  with  fear  and
trembling, so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which we
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can see. Abstract rules indeed can help; but they help less in proportion as our intuitions are
more piercing, and our vocations is the strongest for the moral life.” This latter remark is surely
tempted  by  utilitarian  concerns  about  the  inclusiveness  of  moral  ideas,  but  again  these
normative concerns are re-interpreted by James along non-foundational  lines,  as  exhortations 
rather than as principles.
49. MPML has a last section in which James quarrels about the difference that the existence of
god  would  make  for  his  discourse  on  the  nature  of  ethics.  He  asks  whether,  given  his
characterization of the relationship between moral reflection and the moral life, the postulation
of some divine spectator would make some difference in our way of  portraying it.  I  tend to
downplay  the  importance  of  this  section  in  the  architecture  of  essay,  not  because  it  is
uninteresting, but rather because there James tackles a question that, despite its pertinence, is
external to James’ main line of argumentation and does not add anything to the main argument
of the essay. In fact, there James discusses some important issues that are more in the line of
continuity with his other well-known essay The Will to Believe, which are but an integration of the
discourse of MPML. The two essays share many point of contact in some crucial aspects, but I
think that, for their proper understanding, it is better to keep them separated and read them as
two  arrows  pointing  in  the  same  direction  rather  than  as  two  strings  of  the  very  same
argumentation sharing many of their materials. I cannot pursue the analogy further here.
50. Rivers of ink has been spilled over James’ notion of truth. At the risk of appearing ingenuous,
here I will not discuss any of the relevant literature – since that would go beyond the scope of the
present  essay  –,  and  will  proceed  straight  to  a  very  personal  survey  of  Pragmatism  and  The
Meaning of Truth in order to sort out those central insights of James’ position that are congenial to
the larger point I am making in the present essay. Still, I think that the ‘ethical path’ through
which I articulate James’ notion of truth represents a major strand in his overall conception.
51. James (1907: 37).
52. James (1907: 42).
53. James (1907: 42).
54. James (1907: 104).
55. James (1907: 97).
56. James (1907: 97).
57. James (1907: 119).
58. James (1909: 5).
59. James (1909: 43).
60. For example, in metaphysical terms, as the opposition between Monism vs. Pluralism. For a
discussion  on  these  lines,  one  relevant  for  the  ethical  discourse,  see  Bernstein  1977,  2010;
Goodman (forthcoming); and O’Shea 2000.
61. James (1899a: 132).
62. James (1899a: 133).
63. James (1899a: 149).
64. James (1897: 159).
65. James (1899b: 150).
66. James (1899b: 163).
67. Putnam (1997a: 293).
68. Putnam (1994: 217).
69. Putnam (1994:  223).  Hilary Putnam has reinstated this  point in Putnam 2004.  Ruth Anna
Putnam has elaborated this insight in Putnam 1985, 1987, and 1998.
70. James (1890b: 565-6).
71. James (1897: 148).
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ABSTRACTS
In what follows I shall investigate how the notions of truth and invention inform our moral life.
William James explored at depth this theme in his seminal essay The Moral Philosopher and the
Moral  Life  (MPML).  I  will  claim  that  the  dialectics  of  the  essay  cannot  be  apprehended
independently  from  the  understanding  of  the  moral  psychology  and  epistemology  James
elaborates in his writings on pragmatism and the philosophy of mind. In fact, once framed in the
relevant perspective, the essay conveys a very different and more radical position that the one
usually acknowledged. In MPML James engages in an inquiry into the nature of moral thought
and its ability to meet the difficulties of the moral life it should address. The essay criticizes a
certain image of moral reflection by questioning its underlying assumptions about the nature of
mindedness and the place of  truth in the moral  life.  I  shall  thus articulate the discussion of
James’  essay  along  two  directions,  one  methodological  and  one  substantive.  They are,
respectively, the anti-foundational and anti-theoretical character of moral reflection, and the
rethinking of the relationship we have with our interiority that is relevant for ethics as informed
by the notion of truth.
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